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A quantum cipher supported by a secret key so called keyed communication in quantum noise
(KCQ) is very attractive in implementing high speed key generation and secure data transmission.
However, Yuen-2000 as a basic model of KCQ has a difficulty to ensure the quantitative security
evaluation because all physical parameter for the cipher system is finite. Recently, an outline of
a generalized scheme so called coherent pulse position modulation(CPPM) to show the rigorous
security analysis is given, where the parameters are allowed to be asymptotical. This may open
a new way for the quantum key distribution with coherent states of considerable energy and high
speed.
In this paper, we clarify a generation method of CPPM quantum signal by using a theory of
unitary operator and symplectic transformation, and show an asymptotic property of security and
its numerical examples.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
An application of quantum phenomena to securing op-
tical network has received much attention. In this case,
instead of mathematical encryption, a guarantee of secu-
rity by a physical principle is expected. So far the quan-
tum key distribution(QKD) based on very weak optical
signals has been developed and demonstrated in many
institutions. However, these have inherent difficulty such
as quantum implementations and very low bit rates com-
pared to current data transmission rates.
In order to cope with such a drawback, in 2000, a new
quantum cipher was proposed [1]. It is a kind of stream
cipher with randomization by quantum noise generated
in measurement of coherent state from the conventional
laser diode. The scheme is called Yuen-2000 protocol(Y-
00) or αη scheme[2,3] which consists of large number of
basis to transmit the information bit and pseudo random
number generator(PRNG) for the selection of the basis.
A coherent state as the ciphertext which is transmitted
from the optical transmitter(Alice) is determined by the
input data and the running key K from the output se-
quence of PRNG with a secret key Ks. The legitimate
receiver(Bob) has the same PRNG, so he can receive the
correct ciphertext under the small error, and simulta-
neously demodulate the information bit. The attacker
(Eve), who does not know the key, has to try to discrim-
inate all possible coherent state signals. Since the signal
distance among coherent state signals are designed as
very small, Eve’s receiver suffers serious error to get the
ciphertext. Such a difference of the accuracy of the ci-
phertext for Bob and Eve brings preferable security which
cannot be obtained in any conventional cipher. Unfor-
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tunately, it is very difficult to clarify the quantitative
security evaluation for this type of cipher, because all
physical parameter for the cipher system is finite. So far,
complexity theory approach [4] and information theoretic
approach [5] have been tried, but still there is no rigorous
theoretical treatment.
Recently, Yuen has pointed out that it is possible to
show the rigorous security analysis when the parameters
are allowed to be asymptotical, and showed a sketch of
the properties using a model of coherent pulse position
modulation (CPPM) [6]. This may open a new way for
the quantum key distribution with coherent states of con-
siderable energy and high speed.
In this paper, we clarify a generation method of CPPM
quantum signal by using a theory of unitary operator
and symplectic transformation, and show a security prop-
erty and its numerical examples. In the section II, the
back ground for the information theoretic security and
the Shannon limit are explained. In the section III and
IV, we describe a theory of CPPM. In the section V and
VI, we discuss on the security and implementation prob-
lem.
II. BACK GROUND OF INFORMATION
THEORETIC SECURITY
In the conventional cipher, the ciphertext Y is deter-
mined by the information bit X and running keyK. This
is called non random cipher. However, one can introduce
more general cipher system so called random cipher by
noise such that the ciphertext is defined as follows:
Yi = f(Xi,Ki, ri) (1)
where ri is noise. Such a random cipher by noise may
provide a new property in the security. In Shannon
theory for the symmetric key cipher, we have the
following theorem.
2Theorem 1(Shannon, 1949 [7])
The information theoretic security against ciphertext
only attack on data has the limit
H(X |Y ) ≤ H(Ks). (2)
This is called Shannon limit for the symmetric key ci-
pher. To be beyond the Shannon limit is essential for
fresh key generation by communication or information
theoretic security against known plaintext attack in the
symmetric key cipher. In the context of random cipher,
one can exceed this limit. It is known that the necessary
condition for exceeding the limit is Y E 6= Y B [6,8,9].
That is, the ciphertexts for Bob and Eve are different.
Still the necessary and sufficient condition is not clear,
but if the following relation holds, one can say that the
cipher exceeds the Shannon limit
H(X |Y E ,Ks) > H(X |Y B ,Ks) = 0. (3)
This means that Eve cannot pin down the information
bit even if she gets a secret key after her measurement
of the ciphertext while Bob can do it. In the following
sections, we will clarify that CPPM has indeed such a
property.
III. COHERENT PULSE POSITION
MODULATION CRYPTOSYSTEM
The coherent pulse position modulation (CPPM) cryp-
tosystem has been proposed as a quantum cipher permit-
ting asymptotical system parameters [1,6].
Alice encodes her classical messages by the block en-
coding where n-bit block j (j = 1, ...., N = 2n) corre-
sponds to the pulse position modulation (PPM) quantum
signals with N slots,
|Φj〉 = |0〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |α0〉j ⊗ · · · ⊗ |0〉N . (4)
In addition, Alice apply the unitary operator UKi to
PPM quantum signals |Φj〉, where the unitary operator
UKi is randomly chosen via running key Ki generated by
using PRNG on a secret key Ks. Thus, Alice gets CPPM
quantum signal states,
|Ψj(Ki)〉 = UKi |Φj〉 = |α1j(Ki)〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αNj(Ki)〉N ,
(5)
which are sent to Bob. Let us assume an ideal channel.
Since the secret key Ks, PRNG and the map Ki → UKi
are shared by Alice and Bob, Bob can apply the uni-
tary operator U †Ki to the received CPPM quantum sig-
nal |Ψj(Ki)〉 and obtain the PPM quantum signal |Φj〉.
Bob decodes the message by the direct detection for |Φj〉,
which is known to be a suboptimal detection for PPM
signals [10]. Then Bob’s block error rate is given by
P dire = (1−
1
N
)e−|α0|
2
< e−|α0|
2
. (6)
Here e−|α0|
2 ≈ 0 holds for enough large signal energy
S = |α0|2. In contrast, Eve does not know the secret key
Ks and hence she must detect CPPM quantum signals
directly. This makes Eve’s error probaility worse than
Bob’s one.
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF CPPM
In this section, we discuss a method for the construc-
tion of CPPM quantum signals from PPM ones by the
unitary operator associated with a symplectic transfor-
mation.
A. Quantum Gaussian States
The classical probability distribution π is characterized
by the characteristic function φ(z) =
∫
exp[ixT z]π(dx).
The characteristic function of Gaussian distribution with
the mean m and the correlation matrix B is given as
φ(z) = exp[imT z − 1
2
zTBz]. We extend this argu-
ment to define the quantum Gaussian state [11]. We
consider self adjoint operators on a Hilbert space H,
q1, p1, q2, p2, ..., qN , pN satisfying Heisenberg CCR:
[qj , pk] = iδjk~I, [qj , qk] = 0, [pj , pk] = 0, (7)
where δj,k = 1 for j = k and δj,k = 0 for j 6= k. Let us
introduce unitary operators
V (z) = exp( i RT z) (8)
for a real column 2r-vector z and
R = [q1, p1; . . . ; qN , pN ]
T .
The operators V (z) satisfy the Weyl-Segal CCR
V (z)V (z′) = exp
[
i
2
∆(z, z′)
]
V (z + z′), (9)
where
∆(z, z′) = −zT∆Nz′ (10)
is the canonical symplectic form with
∆N =
N⊕
k=1
[
0 ~
−~ 0
]
. (11)
The Weyl-Segal CCR is the rigorous counterpart of
the Heisenberg CCR, involving only bounded operators.
Now we can define the quantum characteristic function
as
φ˜(z) = TrρV (z). (12)
The transformation L satisfying
∆(LT z,LT z′) = ∆(z, z′) (13)
3is called a symplectic transformation. We denote the to-
tality of symplectic transformations by Sp(N,R). Eq.
(13) can be rewritten as
L∆NLT = ∆N . (14)
The symplectic transformation preserves Weyl-Seagl
CCR (9) and hence it follows from Stone-von Neumann
theorem that there exists the unitary operator U satisfy-
ing [11]
V (LT z) = U †V (z)U. (15)
We call such derived operator U the unitary operator
associated with symplectic transformation L.
The density operator ρ is called Gaussian if its quan-
tum characteristic function has the form
φ˜(z) = TrρV (z) = exp
[
imT z − 1
2
zTAz
]
. (16)
In an N -mode Gaussian state, m is a 2N -dimensional
mean vector and A is a 2N×2N -corralation matrix. The
mean m can be arbitrary vector; the necessary and suffi-
cient condition on the correlation matrix A is given by
∆−1N A∆
−1
N +
1
4
A−1 ≤ 0. (17)
The coherent state |α〉 (α = x + iy) is the quantum
Gaussian state with the mean
m =
√
2~(x, y)T (18)
and the correlation matrix
A1 =
~
2
[
1 0
0 1
]
, (19)
and the N -ary coherent state |α1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αN 〉 (αj =
xj + iyj) is the quantum Gaussian state with the mean
m =
√
2~(x1, y1, ....., xN , yN)
T (20)
and the correlation matrix
AN =
N⊕
k=1
~
2
[
1 0
0 1
]
. (21)
B. Generation of CPPM quantum signals by
symplectic transformation
We study a way to generate CPPM quantum signals
by the unitary operator U associated with a symplectic
transformation. Any unitary operator composed of beam
splitters and phase shifts can be described by a symplec-
tic transformation. First, let us consider the state U |φ〉
for a general N -ary coherent state |φ〉 = |α1〉⊗· · ·⊗|αN〉.
By using Eq. (15), the quantum characteristic function
of the state U |φ〉 is given as
φ˜(z) = TrU |φ〉〈φ|U †V (z) = Tr|φ〉〈φ|V (LT z)
= exp
[
(Lm)T z − 1
2
zTLANLT z
]
,
(22)
where m and AN is the mean vector and the correlation
matrix given by Eqs. (20) and (21) respectively. Eq. (22)
shows that the state U |φ〉 is the quantum Gaussian state
with the mean Lm and the correlation matrix LANLT .
Our interest is devoted to the case where the state U |φ〉
is an N -ary coherent state. Then the symplectic trans-
formation L should satisfy the condition LANLT = AN ,
that is,
L ∈ O(2N) := {L ∈M(2N,R)|LLT = I2N} (23)
where I2N is the 2N×2N identity matrix andM(2N,R)
is the set of 2N×2N real matrices. Denoting the totality
of N×N -unitary matrices by U(N), we have the relation
Sp(N,R) ∩O(2N) ∼= U(N). (24)
Here the matrix
L =


r11R(θ11) · · · r1NR(θ1N )
...
...
rN1R(θN1) · · · rNNR(θNN )


∈ Sp(N,R) ∩O(2N),
(25)
with real numbers rjk and rotation matrices R(θjk), cor-
responds to the matrix
LC =


r11e
iθ11 · · · r1Neiθ1N
...
...
rN1e
iθN1 · · · rNNeiθNN


∈ U(N).
(26)
We can find that the unitary operator associated with
LC ∈ U(N) transforms the state |φ〉 = |α1〉⊗· · ·⊗|αN 〉 to
the state |φ′〉 = |α′
1
〉⊗· · ·⊗|α′N〉, where ~α = (α1, ..., αN )T
and ~α′ = (α′
1
, ..., α′N )
T are related in the equation
~α′ = LC~α. (27)
In particular, from the PPM quantum signals |Φj〉 =
|0〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |α0〉j ⊗ · · · ⊗ |0〉N , j = 1, 2, .., N , the CPPM
ones are generated as
|Ψj〉 = ⊗Nk=1|α0rkjeiθkj 〉k, j = 1, 2, ..., N. (28)
In other words, N -ary coherent states
⊗Nk=1|αkj〉k, j = 1, ...N, (29)
are the CPPM quantum signals generated by applying
the unitary operator associated with LC ∈ U(N) to the
PPM quantum signals |Φj〉 if and only if the matrix with
(k, j)-elements αk,j/α0 is unitary.
4V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF CPPM
CRYPTOSYSTEM
A. Heterodyne attack
We give a foundation for discussing security of CPPM
cryptosystem. Without knowing the secret key Ks Eve
cannot apply the appropriate unitary operator to CPPM
quantum signals, and hence she has to receive directly
CPPM quantum signals. Since the quantum optimum
receiver is unknown for such signals, we apply the het-
erodyne receiver, which is suboptimum and appropriate
to discuss the performance of error. This scheme is called
heterodyne attack.
Our main target in this subsection is to study the het-
erodyne attack on U |φ〉, where U is the the unitary op-
erator associated with LC ∈ U(N), and |φ〉 is a general
N -ary coherent state |α1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αN 〉.
Heterodyne detection is characterized by a family of
operators with a parameter β ∈ C,
X(β) =
1
π
|β〉〈β| (30)
The outcomes β of the heterodyne detection for a coher-
ent state |α〉 appears with the probability density func-
tion
Tr|α〉〈α|X(β) = 1
π
|〈α|β〉|2 = 1
π
e−|α−β|
2
, (31)
which represents the normal distribution with the corre-
lation matrix (1/2)I2.
The outcomes ~β = (β1, ..., βN )
T of the indivisual het-
erodyne detection for U |φ〉 obeys the probability density
function,
PU|φ〉(~β) = TrU |φ〉〈φ|U † ⊗Nj=1 X(βj)
= TrU |φ〉〈φ|U † |ψ〉〈ψ|
πN
= Tr|φ〉〈φ|U
†|ψ〉〈ψ|U
πN
,
(32)
with |ψ〉 = |β1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |βN 〉. Here, putting ~β′ =
(β′
1
, ..., β′N )
T = L∗C ~β and taking account of Eq (27), we
get
U †|ψ〉〈ψ|U
πN
= ⊗Nj=1X(β′j). (33)
Note that ∗ represents the conjugate transpose and L∗C
corresponds to the unitary operator U †. Substituting this
equation to Eq. (32), we obtain
PU|φ〉(~β) = P|φ〉(~β′), (34)
where P|φ〉 is the probability density function with which
the outcomes of heterodyne detection for the state |φ〉
appears. Eq. (34) shows that the vectors ~β′ given by
applying the unitary matrix L∗C to the outcomes ~β obeys
the probability density function P|φ〉.
B. Error probability for CPPM quantum signal
with key after measurement
It is difficult to evaluate the error performance for
CPPM quantum signals by heterodyne attack, because
the randomness of PRNG has to be taken into account.
Yuen showed the lower bound of the error performance by
using heterodyne detection for the original PPM quan-
tum signals [6]. But it may be not tight one. Here we
try another approach. We allow Eve to get the secret
key Ks after her measurement by heterodyne for CPPM
quantum signals and hence to know the unitary operator
UKi and the corresponding unitary matrix LC,Ki . Then,
from the discussions in the subsection VA, Eve can apply
the unitary matrix L∗C,Ki to obtain the vector ~β′, which
obeys to the probability density function P|Φj〉. This fact
enables us to apply the decoding process for PPM signals.
That is, Eve may use maximum-likelihood decoding for
~β′, whose rule is to pick the j for which β′j is largest, and
her error probability is given as follows [12]:
P hete (key) =
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2π
exp
[
− (y −
√
2S)2
2
]
QN(y)dy,
(35)
where S = |α0|2, and
QN (y) = 1− [Φ(y)]N−1,
Φ(y) =
1√
2π
∫ y
−∞
exp(−v2/2)dv. (36)
We will compute the lower bounds of Eve’s error proba-
bility P hete (key) to evaluate its convergence speed. The
error probability P hete (key) is lower bounded as [12]:
P hete (key) ≥
1√
2π
∫ z
−∞
exp
[
− (y −
√
2S)2
2
]
QN(y)dy
≥QN (z)Φ(z −
√
2S),
(37)
where the parameter z can take any real number value.
Putting z =
√
fn and n = log2N in (37), we obtain
P hete (key) ≥ Q2n(
√
fn)Φ(
√
fn−
√
2S)→ 1, n→∞.
(38)
Let us consider the case of S = 20. Then Bob’s er-
ror probability P dire is less than 10
−8.69, while P hete (key)
converges to 1. Figure 1 shows convergence behavior
of lower bound for P hete (key). In this figure, the lower
bounds (37) for f = 0.9, 1.1, 1.2, are plotted with respect
to n = logM . Since the parameter f in the lower bound
(37) can take arbitrary real number, values of error prob-
ability P hete (key) exist the region above the graphs in
Figure 1. Note that the above values of f are chosen
as they give better lower bounds for P hete (key). From
Figure 1, it is found that the convergence speed of lower
bound for P hete (key) is very slow; n > 50 ( N > 2
50 ) is
needed to achieve the error probability 0.9.
5Thus, in the CPPM scheme, Eve cannot pin down the
information bit even if she gets the true secret key Ks
and PRNG after her measurement, and consequently it
has been proved that CPPM satisfies Eq(3).
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FIG. 1: Lower bounds for Eve’s decoding error probability in
the case where she gets the secret key Ks after her measure-
ment for CPPM quantum signals
VI. SUBJECTS ON SYSTEM
IMPLEMENTATION
According to the above analysis, one needs large num-
ber of n when the signal energy is large. Here we give a
requirement of channel bandwidth for the secure commu-
nication by CPPM. Let us assume that the signal band
width is Ws when there is no coding. In our scheme,
first one has to transform the n input information bit se-
quence to PPM signal with 2n slots. Second, such PPM
signals are converted into CPPM with the same number
of slots. If one wants to transmit such CPPM signal with
no delay, the required bandwidth is
WCPPM =
2n
n
Ws. (39)
Thus, the bandwidth exponentially increases with re-
spect to n. Since one needs the large n to ensure the
security, one needs a huge bandwidth.
On the other hand, we need to realize the unitary
transformation to generate CPPM quantum signals from
PPM ones. Such transformations may be implemented
by combination of beam splitters and phase shifts [6],
but to generate the CPPM quantum signals with uni-
form distance for all signal, we need also large number
of elements. Thus we need more detailed consideration
for the practical use. In future work, we will specify the
realization method.
VII. CONCLUSION
A crucial element of the coherent pulse position mod-
ulation cryptosystem is a generation of CPPM quantum
signals from PPM ones by a unitary operator. In this pa-
per, we have given a proper theory for a unitary operator
and a symplectic transformation basing on the quantum
characteristic function. Furthermore, by using the above
results, we have shown the lower bound of error proba-
bility in the case where Eve gets the secret key after her
measurement. This result clearly guarantees the fresh
key generation supported by the secret key encryption
system.
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